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Abstract
We investigate a mixed duopoly market where a welfare−maximizing public firm competes
against a profit−maximizing private firm, using a linear−city location−then−price model with
linear transportation costs. We find that, compared with the results in the purely private
duopoly case discussed by Hotelling (1929) and d' Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse
(1979), the condition under which price equilibrium exists for every location of private firm
and public firm is changed while the main result of no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) for the game still holds true.
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1. Introduction 
Studies of mixed markets, in which welfare-maximizing public firms compete against 
profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years.
1 Most 
existing  work  on  mixed  oligopoly  assumes  an  industry  formed  by  firms  selling  a 
homogeneous good. There are also some exceptions. For example, Cremer, Marchand 
and Thisse (1991) examined a mixed market using a Hotelling-type location-then-price 
model  with  quadratic  transportation  costs.  Matsushima  and  Matsumura  (2003a) 
investigated  the  sequential  choice  of  location  in  a  mixed  oligopoly  in  which 
transportation  costs  are  also  assumed  quadratic.  Matsushima  and  Matsumura  (2003b) 
investigated a mixed oligopoly market using a circular city model with quantity-setting 
competition.  So  far,  no  one  has  considered  mixed  duopoly  in  a  linear-city,  linear-
transportation-cost world.  
As for the existence of equilibrium in Hotelling’s location-then-price model in the 
purely private market case, d’Aspremont, et al. (1979) derived the condition under which 
the price equilibrium exists and demonstrated that there is no pure strategy subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for the game when transportation costs are assumed to 
be linear. It is interesting to investigate whether the result of no pure strategy SPNE still 
holds true in the mixed duopoly case. It is also interesting to study under what condition 
price equilibrium exists in the second stage of the game.  
                                                 
1 See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) and Nett (1993) for general reviews of the mixed oligopoly model. For 
recent literature on mixed oligopoly (duopoly), see Pal (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2004), and the 
references in this introduction, etc.   2 
However, there is no paper discussing these two issues. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate  these  issues:  the  issue  of  existence  of  price  equilibrium  and  the  issue  of 
existence  of  pure  strategy  SPNE  in  Hotelling’s  location-then-price  model  in  mixed 
duopoly. Transportation costs are assumed to be linear. We find that, compared with the 
results  in  the  purely  private  duopoly  case  discussed  by  Hotelling  (1929)  and  d’ 
Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), the condition under which price equilibrium 
exists for every location of private firm and public firm is changed while the main result 
of no pure strategy SPNE for the game still holds true.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 
2. In section 3, we solve the game using backward induction, derive the conditions under 
which price equilibrium exists in the second stage of the game, and demonstrate that no 
SPNE exists in this game. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
We  consider  the  following  spatial  competition  model  in  a  mixed  duopoly  market. 
There are two firms producing a homogeneous product at zero marginal cost. Firm a is a 
private firm and firm b is a public firm. In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously 
their location in the unit interval [0, 1]; in the second stage, they choose mill prices 
simultaneously. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] with a unit density. They 
consume a single unit of the product irrespective of its price. Each consumer chooses to 
buy  from  the  firm  with  lower  full  price  (i.e.,  mill  price  plus  transportation  costs). 
Transportation  costs  are linear in distance.  Hence,  the  full  price  paid  by  a  consumer   3 
located at xis equal to  a x t pa − + if buying from firm a, or  ) 1 ( b x t pb − − + if buying 
from firm b, where t is the transportation rate.  Here a is the distance between the location 
of firm a and the left end of the line, i.e., 0; and b is the distance between the location of 
firm b and the right end of the line, i.e., 1 ( 0 ≥ a ,  0 ≥ b , and  1 ≤ +b a ).  
It is easy to get the demand of firm a and firm b:  
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The objective function of firm a is given by 
a a a q p = π                                                               (3) 
and firm b’s objective is to maximize social surplus. Individual demands being perfectly 
inelastic,  this  amounts  to  minimizing  the  total  transportation  costs.  The  total 
transportation costs are: 
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Our solution-concept is a SPNE in which firms choose locations, looking ahead to the 
resulting equilibrium prices. We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibrium so that the 
results are comparable to those in d’Aspremont, et al. (1979). 
   4 
3. Equilibrium and the Existence of Equilibrium 
3.1 The Second Stage 
In the second stage, firm a chooses  a p to maximize its profit and firm b chooses b p to 
minimize  the  total  transportation  costs.  We  examine  the  issue  of  existence  of  price 
equilibrium for every location a and b.  
 
Proposition  1  (the  existence  of  price  equilibrium):  For 1 = +b a ,  there  are  infinite 
equilibria ( b b p p , ε − ). For 1 < +b a , there is an equilibrium point if and only if 
1 ≤ + b a ,                                                                    (5) 
and, whenever it exists, the equilibrium is  ) 1 (
* * b a t p p b a − + = = . 
 Proof: The case  1 = +b a is immediate. Then both firms are located in the same place. 
Since the total transportation costs are constant, the public firm b will not change price 
for any ε − = b a p p . The private firm a will not change price either. 
For  case 1 < +b a ,  it  is  clear  that,  when  ) 1 ( a b t p p b a − − < − ,  TC  is  minimized 
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− + .  So  TC  is  minimized  when b a p p = and  the  public 
firm will choose its price equal to the price charged by the private firm. In other words, 
its reaction function is  
a b p p = .                                                                      (6) 
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Solving (6) and (7) and then substituting the solution into firms’ objective function gives 
us equilibrium prices, firm a’s profit, and total transportation costs: 
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(6) ((8) also) means that two firms choose the same price. Intuitively, the reason for 
this  result  is  as  follows.  By  equating  a p and b p ,  firm  b  shares  equally  the  demand 
between the interval [a, 1-b] so that the total transportation costs are minimized. Next, we 
shall verify that the pair of prices given by (8) is indeed an equilibrium. 
Since the total transportation costs are minimized when b a p p = , the public firm b will 
not change its price if the private firm a does not. It means 
*
b p is an equilibrium strategy 
against
*
a p . For 
*
a p to be an equilibrium strategy against
*
b p , we must have in particular 
that, for any 0 > ε ,   
( ) ε ε π − = − − − − ≥ − + = ta b a t p b a
t
p p b b a a 2 ) 1 ( 1
2
) , (
* 2 * * ,                          (11) 
where, ε − − − − ) 1 (
* b a t pb is  the  profit  firm  a  would  obtain  if  it  changed  its  price  to 
ε − − − − ) 1 (
* b a t pb and  captured  the  entire  demand.  Since  ) 1 (
* * b a t p p b a − + = = is  the 
unique pure strategy price equilibrium when  ) 1 ( a b t p p b a − − < − , the aforementioned 
deviation is the only relevant one to consider.   6 
Let  0 → ε ,  (11) becomes( )
2
1 4 a b a + − ≥ , which can be written as 1 2 a b a + − ≥  
and be further simplified to (5). 
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
 
3.2 The First Stage 
We  will  neglect  the  case  1 = +b a since  the  public  firm  b  can  lower  the  total 
transportation costs by moving away from the private firm a. Hence, a and b such that 
1 = +b a cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect location equilibrium. 
Next, we will consider the case 1 < +b a . In the first stage, firm a chooses location a to 
maximize (9) and firm b chooses location b to minimize (10). Differentiating (9) with 
respect to a gives us 0 ) 1 ( > − + = ∂
∂ b a t a
a π , which means that a should be as large as 
possible. Differentiating (10) with respect to b yields the first-order condition: 1 3 = + b a . 
So the location equilibrium is  ε 3 1− = a and ε = b , where ε  is an infinitesimally positive 
number. However, this location equilibrium cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect 
location equilibrium because the condition (5) is violated. 
Thus, we get the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Like in the purely private duopoly case, there does not exist a SPNE in 
Hotelling’s linear-city location-then-price model when the transportation costs are linear 
in the mixed duopoly case.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
There is a large literature on mixed oligopoly. However, until now, there is no paper 
investigating the issue of the existence of SPNE in Hotelling’s linear-city location-then-  7 
price model in mixed duopoly and the issue of the existence of price equilibrium in the 
second stage of the game. The purpose of this paper is to investigate these two issues. 
 We find that, compared with the results in the purely private duopoly case discussed 
by Hotelling (1929) and d’ Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), the condition 
under which price equilibrium exists for every location of private firm and public firm is 
changed while the main result of no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for the 
game still holds true. 
Finally,  we  point  out  that  in  Hotelling’s  linear-city  location-then-price  game  with 
quadratic transportation costs in a mixed duopoly, there exists pure strategy SPNE, and 
that for every location, there exists price equilibrium in the second stage of the game.
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